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A SECOND ORDER LOGIC OF EXISTENCE1 
NINO B. COCCHIARELLA 
A. N. Prior in [9] has suggested an approach towards a second order logic of 
existence where, following medieval logicians, we distinguish "between predicates 
(like 'is red', 'is hard', etc.) which entail existence, and predicates (like 'is thought 
to be red', 'is thought of, etc.) which do not."2 Let us refer to attributes (including 
relational attributes) which are designated by the former kind of predicate as 
existence attributes, or for brevity, e-attributes. It is suggested then that 'x exists' 
be defined as 'there is some e-attribute which x possesses'. In what follows, this 
approach regarding the concept of existence is formalized semantically as well as 
syntactically, and a completeness theorem is established corresponding to the 
completeness (in a secondary sense, i.e., as including normal, nonstandard models) 
of standard second order logic (as formulated, for example, in Church [1]). 
In [2] (cf. the abstracts [3] and [4]), the present author formalized a complete 
first order logic (with identity) of actual and possible objects which was there used 
in the formulation of a complete first order tense logic.3 The observation, which will 
be proved here, was made by Prior that in a second order logic with e-attributes 
quantification over actual objects can be appropriately defined so that every 
theorem of the first order logic of actual and possible objects becomes a theorem of 
second order logic with e-attributes.4 In effect, the definition (where <f> is a formula, 
a is an individual variable, and n is a 1-place predicate variable) is 
e e 
A a$ =df A «[V ^7Tia) "* 4>] 
or, in idiomatic English, 'every actual individual satisfies <j>' is construed as mean-
ing 'every possible individual which possesses some e-attribute satisfies <f>\B 
Received April 5, 1968. 
1 1 am indebted to the referee for helpful suggestions in revisions of an earlier draft of this 
paper. For a more philosophical discussion of the present system, especially of the substitu-
tion free form of its axiom set, cf. [7]. 
2
 p. 161. 
3
 In [5], completeness theorems in modal logic were also established utilizing this first order 
logic of actual and possible objects. In addition, completeness theorems for a logic of actual 
objects and a tense logic with quantification only over actual objects were also established, as 
well as subsequently a completeness theorem for a tense logic with quantification only over past 
and present objects. 
4
 op. cit., p. 162. 
5
 It might be remarked, however, that the present formulation of second order logic with 
e-attributes is not exactly in the form which Prior has in mind. In [9, p. 161f ], Prior distinguishes 
quantification over e-attributes from quantification over attributes in general by means of 
different types of predicate variable. In the present version we do not make a distinction between 
e 
types of predicate variables but rather introduce as primitive a new quantifier A for quanti-
fication over e-attributes (when followed by a predicate variable and for quantification over ex-
isting or actual objects when followed by an individual variable). 
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§1. Terminology. As primitive logical constants, we take ->, the conditional 
e 
sign; /\, the universal quantifier; and /\, the (restricted or) e-universal quantifier. 
Terms, formulas and other syntactical expressions are understood in the usual 
manner (cf. [6]), and for convenience we shall use f<f>', 't/i', 'x ' to refer to formulas, 
'a' , ' /} ' , 'y ' to refer to individual variables, 'IT', 'p', 'a', ' T ' to refer to predicate 
expressions,' £',' v',' I ' to refer to terms, and V \ ' v ' to refer to both individual and 
predicate variables. Regarding proper substitution of formulas for predicate 
variables, we adopt the definition given in Church [1, p. 192f]. However, we shall 
utilize the notation. 
A^o, • ••»«>;-i)l 
* l * J 
in place of Church's notation 
x77(a0 , • • • , a n _ 1 ) , | 6 
§2. The semantics of second order logic with e-attributes. In describing the 
model-theoretic semantics of a logic in which we wish to distinguish actual objects 
from possibilia in general, it is appropriate that a distinction be made between the 
universe of actual {existing) objects of a given model and the (usually) wider domain 
of discourse or set of possibilia of that model. In [2] and [3], such a notion of a 
model for the first order logic of actual and possible objects there constructed was 
characterized and in a way so as to preserve the essential content of Tarski's well-
known procedures in this area. We retain that notion here and, of course, develop 
or expand upon it for purposes of second order logic with e-attributes. Accordingly, 
where L is a language, we say that 2t is a model suited to L, or for brevity, is an 
L-model, if and only if there are sets A, B, R such that 21 = (A, B, R}, A £ B 
(i.e., the universe of actual objects of 21 is included in the domain of discourse or 
set of possibilia of 21), B ^ 0 (i.e., 21 is not devoid of possibilia though it may have 
no actual objects), R is a function with L as its domain, and for all n, IT, 8, (i) if 
nea> and IT is an n-place predicate constant in L, then R(*r) s Bn, and (ii) if n e <o 
and S is an «-place operation constant in L, then R(8) e BB".'! We say that 21 is a 
model if 21 is an Z,-model for some language L. By the universe of (actual objects of) 
a model 21, in symbols < a^, the set of possibilia relative to 21, in symbols ^ , and the 
language of 21, in symbols L%, we understand the sets A, B and the domain of R, 
respectively, where 21 = {A, B, R). If 6 e Lj,, we set 0„ = R(6). 
Following Henkin in [8], we say, where L is a language, that 93 is a secondary 
6
 Church's definition must of course be amended to recognize that occurrences of predicate 
e 
and individual variables may be bound by either of our two quantifiers, A. A-
7
 As usual, we take <o to be the set of natural numbers and read 'n e a>' as 'n is a natural 
number'. In addition, where A'and Kare sets, XY is understood to be the set of functions with 
Y as domain and with ranges included in X. We understand each natural number to be the set 
of natural numbers less than it and understand an n-termedsequence or an n-tuple, where new, 
to be a function with n as its domain. Consequently, where n e <o, Bn is the set of all «-termed 
sequences whose constituents are in B. 
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L-model if and only if there are an L-model 91 and an a>-indexed family <F„>n60) 
such that SB = <9l, <Fn>neo)> and for each n e w, F„ is a subset of the set of all 
subsets of ^ 5 (i-e-» every member of Fn is a subset of ^ y . We understand 33 to be 
a secondary model, or for brevity a 2-model, if 33 is a secondary L-model for some 
language L. Where S3 = <9l, <Fn>nem> and 33 is a 2-model, we set <^e = ^« , 
0>9 = ^V and LB = La. 
We say that a is an assignment in a 2-model <9t, <F„>nea)> if a is a function whose 
domain is the set of variables (both individual and predicate) and which is such that 
(1) for each individual variable a, a(a) e 0"*, and (2) for each new and for each n-
place predicate variable w, O(TT) e Fn. If a is such an assignment of values to vari-
ables, we understand al l> where p is a predicate or individual variable, to be that 
assignment (of values to variables) which is identical to a in all respects except (at 
most) in its assigning x to p. 
The notion of the value of a term £ or of a predicate expression IT of a language L 
with respect to a secondary L-model 91 and an assignment a in % in symbols 
Val(£, 9t, a) or Val(7r, 9t, a), is characterized recursively as follows: (1) if /J, is an 
individual or a predicate variable, then Val(/x, 91, a) = a(/x), (2) if -n is a predicate 
constant jn L, then Val(n-, 91, a) = 7ra, and (3) if n e a>, S is an n-place operation 
constant in L, and £0> • • •» £n-i are terms of L, then Val(3(£0, • • •, £n-i). % a) — 
8„(Val(£0, « , a), • • •, V a l ^ , «, a)). 
Where 91 is a 2-model and a is an assignment in 91, we characterize the notion of 
satisfaction of an arbitrary formula of LM (by a in 91) by the following recursive 
clauses: (1) if n e o>, IT is an «-place predicate expression of La, and £0> • • •, £B-i a r e 
terms of La, then a satisfies ir{to, • • •, £„_i) in 9t if and only if <Val(£0, 91, a), • • •, 
Val(£„_i, 91, a)> e Val(7r, 91, a); (2) if <f>, if> are formulas of L, then a satisfies (<£ -> </>) 
in 91 if and only if either a does not satisfy <f> in 9t or a satisfies t/i in 9t; (3) if ^ is a 
formula of L„ and a is an individual variable, then a satisfies /\a</> in 91 if and only 
if for all x e ^ , al J satisfies <f> in 91; (4) if <j> is a formula of L„ and a is an individual 
variable, then a satisfies /\a<f> in 9t if and only if for all x e <%%, al I satisfies <f> in 
91; (5) if ^ is a formula of LM, new, and 77 is an «-place predicate variable, then a 
satisfies /\ir</> in 91 if and only if for all F e F„, al I satisfies <^  in 9t; and (6) if </> is 
a formula of L%, n e <o, and 7r is an n-place predicate variable, then a satisfies 
/\TT<I> in 9t if and only if for all F e Fn, if F c *S, then a ^ ) satisfies <£ in 91. If 
91 is a 2-model, then a formula of La is said to be true in 91 if it is satisfied by every 
assignment in 91. 
In regard to the notion of secondary validity (logical truth) a certain rather natural 
restriction must be imposed on 2-models to obtain what we, following Church, 
shall call the normal 2-models, a restriction which in effect stipulates that in order 
for a 2-model <9l, <Fn>n6m> to be relevant or normal, each Fn, for new, must be 
closed in a rather obvious way. What is desired is that we restrict our considera-
tions to those 2-models <9t, <Fn>nSffl> which are such that whenever a condition can 
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be specified by means of a formula <j> of L« with, say, n distinct free individual 
variables, then there exists in Fn an (zz-place) attribute F (i.e., a set F s ^tt) such 
that all and only those n-tuples of (possible) individuals of 9t possess (belong to) F 
that satisfy the condition <f>. This rather obviously desired restriction can be cap-
tured as follows. We shall say that a 2-model S3 is normal if and only if for each 
formula <j> of L8, the formula V W o • • • A a n - i W«o» • • •» an- i ) <-> 4>] is t r u e in S3, 
where n e co, 77 is an w-place predicate variable which does not occur free in <£, and 
«o, • • •, «„_! are all the distinct individual variables occurring free in </>.B 
Accordingly, (f> is said to be secondarily valid, or for brevity, 2-valid, if and only 
if there is a language L such that <j> is a formula of Z, and <£ is true in every normal 
secondary L-model. 
§3. A substitution free axiom set for second order logic with e-attributes. In what 
follows we present a complete (with respect to 2-validity) formulation of second 
order logic with e-attributes by means of an axiom set whose characterization does 
not require the notion of proper substitution of either a term for an individual 
variable or of a formula for a predicate variable. 
DEFINITION. -A formula 8 is a {second order) logical axiom if and only if there 
are natural numbers n, k, individual variables a, /30, • • •, /Stt_lf y0, • • •, Ykxi, predi-
cate variables n, p, a, T, a predicate or individual variable p., terms £, 77, and formulas 
<$>, I/I, x such that 6 is a generalization of one of the following formulas: 
(A2) 0 - 0 - x)] "> [(* - 0 -> to -+ X)] 
(A4) A / ^ - ^ « - ^ ( A ^ - > A ^ ) 
(A5) <j> -> A /•"£» where /* does not occur free in <£, 
(A6) V » A ft • • • A /5»-i[«05o, • • •, i8„-!)<-» ^], 
where |S0, • • • , /3n_x are all the distinct 
individual variables that occur free in <f> 
and 77 is an «-place predicate variable 
which does not occur free in </>, 
(A7) V « A p[p(°0 ~*" P©]. where a is an individual variable which 
does not occur in £, 
(A8) /\ p[p(£) ->• /J(I?)] -> (0 ->• ^), where <f>, </> are atomic formulas, and $ is 
obtained from <f> by replacing an occur-
rence of £ with an occurrence of 77, 
8
 This characterization of normal 2-models differs somewhat from that given by Church in 
[1, p. 308], as well as his equivalent alternative formulation on p. 316. (Church's latter formula-
tion in effect would not require that a0, • • •, an_j be all the distinct individual variables with 
free occurrences in <j>, but only that a0,---,an-i be distinct individual variables whether they 
occur in <j> or not.) Nevertheless, it can easily be shown to be equivalent to either of Church's 
characterizations (with the understanding that we have a wider notion of formulahood involved), 
and it has the virtue of being somewhat more obvious or perspicacious for obtaining the closure 
conditions desired, especially in the light of the notion of definability. (This equivalence for 
e 
standard formulas, i.e., those in which /\ does not occur, follows directly from Theorem 1 
below and the main result established in [6].) 
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(A9) A °(<f> -> # -> (A <4 -> A <4). 
(Aio) A ^ - > A ^ > 
(Ail) A» V T A Y O • • • Ay f c - iWro , • • • , y * - i ) < - > H P o . • • • , 0 , - 0 * fa 
where 7r is an «-place predicate variable 
which does not occur free in <f>, T is a 
&-place predicate variable distinct from w 
and which does not occur free in <f>, 
A>, • • •, Ai-i are all the distinct individual 
variables which occur free in <f>, and 
yo, • • •, Yk-i are pairwise distinct indivi-
dual variables such that {y0, • • •, yk-i} £ 
(A12) V *• A i8o • • • A Pn-iMPo, • • •, Pn-d<-• V "(ft,, • • •, ft,.,)], 
where ft>, • • •, ft,_i are pairwise distinct 
individual variables, 
(A13) A A> • • • A 0»-i*«-* A ft> • • • A iSn-itV *"Kft>, • • •, A. -0 -* * ] . 
We shall have only one inference rule in the present system, viz., modus ponens. 
Derivation of a formula <f> from a set T of formulas is understood in the usual way, 
and we say T yields <f>, in symbols r h <j>, if <j> is derivable from I\ If T is empty, we 
write 'H^' for T (-<£' and say that <j> is a theorem (of second order logic with 
e-attributes) if l-<£. 
In [6], it was shown that (A1)-(A8) characterize a complete (with respect to 
2-validity) axiom set for standard second order logic. A completeness theorem 
(with respect to 2-validity) for the extension of the notion of standard formula to 
e 
that of formula (as defined here, i.e., as allowing occurrences of A ) of course 
requires axioms in addition to (A1)-(A8). 
THEOREM 1. If<j>isa theorem of second order logic with e-attributes, then <j> is 
secondarily valid. 
PROOF. It is clear from the definition of satisfaction (and hence of truth) that 
every logical axiom of any of the forms (A1)-(A5), (A7)-(A10) is true in any 
secondary model (in the language of which it is formulable) and that modus ponens 
preserves truth in every model. Moreover, that every axiom of the form (A6) is 
2-valid is an immediate consequence of the definition of 2-validity. It remains only 
to consider axioms of the forms (A11)-(A13); but as the proofs of 2-validity are 
straightforward we will only detail the proof of (A 12). 
Suppose that i/i is an instance of (A 12) formulable in a normal 2-model S3 = 
<2*,<Fn>„effl>. Then 0 = V^Aft, • • ' A ^ - i K A , , - • - A - a ^ V ^ o , - • - . f t - i ) ] . 
Assume now that a is an assignment in 33. Then, since 23 is normal, a satisfies 
W \ A > •••Ai8n-iK|8o,--- , i8n_1)^VrT(i30 ,--- ,^n_1)] in 23, this formula 
being an instance of (A6). Accordingly, there is an F e F „ such that for all 
x0, • • •, *„-i e ^ a , <*0, •••,*„_!> e F if and only if ayp° _ ^ n _ 1 j satisfies 
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e 
VTT(A>, • • •, j8n-i) in ®» i-e., if and only if there is a G e F„ such that G s ^ J 
and <x0, • • • , j c „ . 1 ) e G ; from which it follows that any n-tuple in F is an n-tuple 
in some subset of ^ g . and therefore that F^ °il%. Consequently, a satisfies 
ty"APo---M»-iMPo,---,P»-i)<->tyT7(p0,- - -,/9»_0] ^ »• We conclude 
then that every instance of (A12) is 2-valid. 
§4. Some theorems of second order logic with e-attributes. In order to prove that 
our present axiomatic formulation is complete (with respect to 2-validity), we need 
to establish some useful lemmas, the most important of which are the specification 
principles regarding each kind of quantification. Where proofs are not given it is 
understood that they proceed exactly as in the analogous standard situation. We 
avoid writing obvious lemmas such as the deduction theorem. We utilize our 
convention of having specific groups of Greek letters for the different kinds of 
expression in what follows by not bothering to specify in each case the kind of 
expression involved. 
We presuppose the notion of a tautology or tautologous formula without going 
into the definition here. Because of (A1)-(A3) and the completeness of sentential 
logic, we have the following lemma. 
LEMMA 1. If<j>isa tautologous formula, then V<f>. 
LEMMA 2. If T \-<f> and Y I- (<£-> 0), then V Vij,. 
LEMMA 3. IfT V <j> and\L is a predicate or individual variable which does not occur 
free in any member of T, then T h /\i*4>. 
LEMMA 4. 7/TI-4"j and £ does not occur in any member of V, then V Y /\axj>-
LEMMA 5. / / r i - ^ n and p does not occur in any member of V, then V V /\ir<f>. 
LEMMA 6. IfT r<f> andp is a predicate or individual variable which does not occur 
e 
free in any member of F, then T h /\(i4-
PROOF. Lemma 6 follows directly from (A10), (A13) and Lemmas 2 and 3. 
(Q.E.D.) 
LEMMA 7. Ifn is a predicate or individual variable which does not occur free in <j>, 
e 
then V<f> ->• /\fi(f>. 
PROOF. Lemma 7 follows trivially from (A5), (A10), (A13) and Lemmas 1, 2 
and 3. (Q.E.D.) 
e 
LEMMA 8. l"Aa<A ~*" /\tt4>-
PROOF. Lemma 8 is an immediate consequence of (A 13) and Lemmas 1 and 2. 
(Q.E.D.) 
e e e 
LEMMA 9. Y/\a(<f> -»• <A) -*• (A«<£ -*• (Aa^)-
PROOF. Lemma 9 follows directly from (A2), (A4), (A 13) and Lemmas 1, 2 
and 3. (Q.E.D.) 
We note that Lemmas 8 and 9 are two of the axioms of the first order logic of 
actual and possible objects formulated in [2] and [3]. The proofs for Lemmas 10, 
11, and 12 are similar to the proofs of their analogues in the system of [6]. 
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LEMMA 10. Iftf> is obtained from </> by replacing a free occurrence oft, by a free 
occurrence ofrj, then Y/\TT{TT(]£) -*• 77(77)] -> (<f> -> 4>) and ("A^tHO -*• ^ C1?)] -*• (0 -*• <!>)• 
For convenience let us use = for the sign of identity, definable (in the metalan-
guage) as follows: 
t = -n =df AwM0-»• wfo)] 
(where wis, say, the first 1 -place predicate variable). Lemma 10, of course, establishes 
the general form of Leibniz' law as a theorem, i.e., h£ = r? -> (<j> -*• if), where 0 is 
obtained from <f> by replacing a free occurrence of £ by a free occurrence of 7?. 
LEMMA 11. If a does not occur in £ and <f> is obtained from <f> by proper substitution 
of £ for a, then l-/\a<f> -*• <p. 
Lemma 12, to follow, is our general specification principle for possibilia. 
LEMMA 12. If 0 is obtained from <f> by proper substitution of £ for a, then 
Lemma 13, to follow, is one variant of our specification principle for actual 
objects. 
LEMMA 13. If 4> is obtained from <f> by proper substitution of £ for a, then 
rVWO-^A^^)-
PROOF. Assume the hypothesis. Then, 
l-A «[V 7nr(a) -*" 4>\ -»• (V "HO -*- 0) by Lemma 12, 
e e 
\-/\ «0->(V irM.0-*• i/>) by (A 13) and Lemmas 1 and 2, and 
therefore 
e e 
hV «w(£) -*• (A «£ -> 0) by Lemmas 1 and 2. (Q.E.D.) 
e 
The formula V'7"'© asserts (with respect to a 2-model SB) that the referent of 
£ (in 83) possesses some e-attribute, and therefore that the referent of £ (in S3) is an 
actual object (of S3), i.e., that the referent of £ exists (as an actual object of 83). 
Defining the predicate E\ for existence is of course straightforward: 
£!(<*) =dfV™(«). 
In the first order logic (with identity) of actual and possible objects of [2] and 
[3], assertion of the existence of the referent of £ (in a model 9t) was captured by 
e 
means of the formula \/aa = £, which in the higher order context is understood to 
e 
be an abbreviation of V a A^W") ""*" M.Q]- Accordingly, an alternative definition 
of£!is 
£!(«)=„ WA*K|3)-**(«)]. 
The following two lemmas, of which the proofs are straightforward, establish the 
equivalence of these two alternative definitions of existence. 
e 





LEMMA 15. Ifce,p are distinct individual variables, then \-\/mT(a) -> \/p A 
ir[w<j8)-**(«)]. 
64 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA 
LEMMA 16. If*l>is obtained from <f> by proper substitution of £,for a and /3 does not 
occur in £, then l"V|8 A^^O3) -»• *<£)] ~* (A«<£ -»• $ • 
PROOF. Lemma 16 follows directly from Lemmas 13, 14, 3 and 12. (Q.E.D.) 
LEMMA 17. Iffi is obtained from */> by replacing an occurrence of<f> by an occur-
rence of4>', !-<£ ->• <f>' and \-<f>' -+ $, then \-iji -> >fi' and ty -> tfi. 
PROOF. By a simple inductive argument using Lemmas 1-3, 6, 7, (A4)-(A5) and 
(A13). (Q.E.D.) ^ 
LEMMA 18. \-/\« \/p A^IX/8) -*• "•(«)]• 
PROOF. 
•"APIA "W#->«(«))-*A*~»ff)]-»- [A «(«(«)">*<«))-* A » ~ "(«)] 
by Lemma 12, 
•"A PIA ^ O 8 ) -* "(«)) "* A » ~ ^O3)] -»• A "• ~ *K«) 
by Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, 
e e 
!"A 0 ~ A ^M3) -*• w(a)] -> A "• ~ 7Ka) 
by (A 13) and Lemmas 17, 1 and 2, and 
therefore 
h/\ a V j8 A "•["•(£) -»• "(<*)] by Lemmas 3, 1, 2 and (A13). (Q.E.D.) 
e e 
Lemma 18 establishes that Y/\a V/3" = J3- This formula (as a first order formula) 
was taken as an axiom in the first order logic (with identity) of actual and possible 
objects formulated in [2] and [3]. Accordingly, as modusponens is the only inference 
rule of that first order system and as each of its axioms is either an axiom or 
derivable (by Lemmas 8, 9 and 18) as a theorem of the present system, then every 
(second order analogue of a) theorem of the first order logic (with identity) of 
actual and possible objects is a theorem of second order logic with e-attributes. 
For the statement of the lemmas to follow we not only retain our convention 
of using specific groups of Greek letters for the different kinds of expressions but 
assume in addition that n is a natural number, TT is an n-place predicate variable, 
and a0, • • •, <*„_! are pairwise distinct individual variables. 
We remark that Lemmas 19 and 20 are the analogues of Lemmas 10 and 11. 
The analogue of Lemma 12, viz., the general specification principle for attributes, 
is provable in the present system but as it is not needed to establish our complete-
ness theorem we avoid giving its proof here. Lemma 21 is a restricted analogue of 
Lemma 13. A more general version of the specification principle for e-attributes is 
provable, but, again, as it is not needed here we avoid giving its proof. The proofs 
for Lemmas 19 and 20 are similar to the proofs of their analogues in the system of 
[6]. 
LEMMA 19. If a0,- •• ,<Xn-i ore all the individual variables that have free occur-
rences in 0, then Y/\a0 • • -A«n-iW«o,- • •,<*n-i)<^4>]^U-+<l>l^ao'' '. ' " " " " J j 
and rA«o • • • A«-- iW«o. • •' • «»-i)<-> <M -* (<f>[r(ao'' "^ a n _ l ) ] - 4 
LEMMA 20. Ifa0, • • •, a„_a are all the individual variables that have free occur-
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rences in <fi, and TT does not have a free occurrence in <j>\ ' #' n » then 
LEMMA 21. Ifa0, • • •, an_x are all the individual variables that have free occur-
rences in <fi, and TT does not have a free occurrence in <j>\ ' n > then 
i-W A«o • • • A«»-iW«o, • • •, ««»-i) •-» fl -> (A*tf -* «^[,r(o:o'' '^ ' a n _ l ) ] ) -
PROOF. Assume the hypothesis. Then, 
t-A «o • • • A « . - iK% • • • ,«»-i)<-fl -> (*-^[ 7 r ( a ° ' ' "0*a n _ l ) ] ) 
by Lemma 19, 
l-A *r[~<£ J^ 0 ' ' y a " - l ) ] - ( ^ - > ~A«o • • • A «»-iK«o. • • •, «„-i) W ] ) ] 
by Lemmas 1, 2, and 6, 
i -A*-^ 0 * 0 ' '^'a n _ l ) ] 
e e 
- * ( A ^ - » • A w ~ A «o • • • A " n - i K ^ . • • •»«n-i)*-»• ^]) 
by (A9) and Lemmas 1 and 2 
> . W a 0 . • • • , «n- l ) l .
 A J L T ^ O . • • • » a n - l ) l h
~^[ * J^A"~<£[ ^ J 
by Lemma 7, and therefore 
i-V«• A «o • • • A «.-1W«o,• • •,«n-0<-•<l>)->(A ^->^[ 7 r ( o t ° '"^""- 0 ] ) 
by Lemmas 1 and 2. (Q.E.D.) 
LEMMA 22. Ifn has no free occurrences in <f> and a0, • • •, an_1 are all the indivi-
dual variables that have free occurrences in <f>, then 
e 
•"A «0 • • • A «n- l [^ -*• V " ( « 0 . • • • » «n-l)] 
e 
"*" V "• A "0 • •• A a n- lK«0> • ••»«n-l)<-> HI-
PROOF. Assume the hypothesis and let a be an «-place predicate variable 
distinct from TT and which has no free ocburrences in <f>. Then, 
e e 
•V a A a0 • • • A «n- l W«0» • • • . «n-l) <-* V WJK«0> • • • . «n-l)] 
by (A12), 
e e 
\-/\a\/ TT /\a0 • • • A « n - l W « 0 , • • - . " n - l ) * - * ^ ^ . - • - . « n - l ) A <f>] 
by (All), 
e e 
•"V * A a 0 • • • A » n - l K « 0 , • • • , « „ - l ) <-> V ww(«0, • • • » « n - l ) A <£] 
by Lemmas 21 and 2, 
e 
•"A a0 • • • A « . - l W ° 0 . • • • > «n-l) «-• V """"(ao. • • • » a n - l ) A $ 
e 
- * - ( A a 0 • • • A an-l[<A -> V ^ ( " O , • • • , «n-l)] 
-*• A a0 • • • A «n-l W«0, • • • , «n-l) «-» <£]) 
by Lemma 3, (A4) and Lemmas 1 and 2, 
and therefore 
5—J.S.L. 
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•"A "0 • • • A an-l[<£ ->" V l™(.t*0, ••-, «n-l)] 
e 
-*" V "" A "0 • • • A «n-lK«0. • • • , «n-l) <-» ^] 
by Lemmas 6, 7, (A9) and Lemmas 1 and 
2. (Q.E.D.) 
LEMMA 23. If it has no free occurrences in <f>, p is a l-place predicate variable 
distinct from it and which has no free occurrences in <f>, and a0, • • •, «n-i ore all the 
individual variables that have free occurrences in <f>, then for each natural number 
e e 
i < n, WjTt/\a0 • • • A « n - l K « 0 , - • •» « n - l ) < - > ^ ] -*• A a 0 • • • A a n - l [ < £ "> Vp/>(«i)]-
PROOF. Assume the hypothesis. Then, 
e 
•"V *" A a0 • • • A «n-lK«0. • • • » «n-l) *-* <f>] 
e e 
-*• ( A v V P A «il>(«f) *"»• M?*0, • • • , «n-l) A ^] 
- * V p A a i W « i ) ^ ^ A fl) 
by Lemma 21, 
e e 
hV w A «o • • • A «n-iW«o, • • •, «n-i)<-> ^] -*• V /> A «([p(a0<-• ^] 
by (All) and Lemmas 17, 1 and 2, 
• V p A «<[/>(«<) «-• fl -*• 0 -> V />/>(«()] 
by Lemmas 12, 6 (A9), and Lemmas 7, 
1 and 2 and therefore 
e e 
•"V "• A «0 • • • A «n-lK«0, • • • . «n-l) <"* «A] ->• A "0 • • • A «n-l[<£ ->• V P/>(«l)] 
by Lemma 3, (A4), (A5) and Lemmas 1 
and 2. (Q.E.D.) 
§5. A completeness theorem for second order logic with e-arrributes. The proof 
we give for the completeness theorem to follow is a natural extension of Henkin's 
proof for the completeness of standard second order logic. As we are dealing with 
a wider notion of formulahood, however, it is requisite that we indicate the major 
steps of the proof. 
As usual, we say that a set Y of formulas is consistent if there is no formula <f> 
such that r I- </> and r h ~ <j>, and where L is a language, we say that T is a maximally 
consistent set of sentences of L if Y is a consistent set of sentences of L such that for 
each sentence <f> of Z,, either <f> e Y or T u {~<£} is not consistent. 
THEOREM 2. If Y is a consistent set of sentences of a language L, then there exists 
a normal secondary model 93 such that every sentence in Y is true in 33. 
PROOF. Where A is the least infinite ordinal equinumerous with or greater than 
L, we add to L new individual constants £0, • • •, £w, • • • (JJ. e A) and, for each 
neai, the n-place predicate constants 77J}, • • •, 77J, • • • (ju. e A) and call the resulting 
language L*. Let S1; S2, • • •, Sw, • • • Qx e A) be an ordering of the set of sentences 
<f> of Z,* for which there are an n e to, an n-place predicate variable a, an individual 
e e 
variable a and a formula ^ of Z,* such that <$> is either V<*A> Va^» V ^ o r VCT^-
We define by ordinal recursion the chain r 0 , • • •, r„, • • • (\x. e A) as follows: 
(1) Y0 = Y; (2) if LUJ1,, u {Zv} is not consistent, then r„ = U « « r ^ ; (3) if 
Uneven u {£«} is consistent, then 
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(a) if E„ = Va<£> f°r s o m e formula </> of Z,* and some individual variable a, then 
r» = U*.»r« u | ^ T r w h e r e ' i s t h e l e a s t ordinal A: < A such that £fc does not 
occur in any member of \J„ev^u! 
e 
(b) if £„ = Va<£> f°r some formula <f> of L* and some individual variable a, then 
rv = U«et>r<i u "m r ' VTT(£) >•' where T is the first 1-place predicate variable 
and i is the least ordinal k < A such that £fc does not occur in any member of 
\Jitev*- «> 
(c) If S„ = VCT& for some formula <£ of Z,*, some new, and some n-place 
predicate variable a, then Tv = U«et>r« u "i^ *n f' where i is the least ordinal A: 
< A such that -n% does not occur in any member of KJ^TFU \ and 
e 
(d) If S„ = VCT »^ for some formula <f> of Z,*, some new, and some n-place 
predicate variable a, then 
r, = j j r„ u |^[j„]' W A « o ' • • A «»-IK«O, • • •, <*n-iWfr(«0, • • • .«n-i)]l 
where p is the first n-place predicate variable different from o,a0,---,an_1 are the 
first n individual variables, and i is the least ordinal k < A such that n-J does not 
occur in any member of \JuevTu. 
For each v e A, r„ is consistent. The proof of this is by induction and we must 
consider four cases. In case Z„ = Va& f°r some formula <f> and some individual 
variable a, or Ev = V°$> f°r some formula <f>, some new and some n-place predi-
cate variable a, the consistency of r„ follows by the inductive hypothesis and Lemma 
e 
4. In case S„ = \/a<f>, for some formula <}> and some individual variable a, the 
consistency of r„ follows by Lemma 4 together with (A13). Finally, in case S„ = 
e 
\/ar<f), for some formula <f>, some new, and some n-place predicate variable a, the 
consistency of r„ requires Lemma 5, (A9) and (A 10), together with Lemma 11 and 
(All). 
We conclude that T„ is consistent for all v e A. Now let I" be the union of all 
rv, for v e A, i.e., let F = UOEAIV In the usual manner, we conclude that I" is 
consistent, since otherwise r„ is not consistent for some ve X, which is impossible. 
Accordingly, by Lindenbaum's lemma, there is a maximally consistent set K of 
sentences of L* such that I" s K. 
By a closed term of £* we shall mean a term of L+ in which no (individual) 
variable occurs. Where -q is a closed term of Lm, let [rj\ be the set of closed terms £ 
of L* such that for some 1-place predicate variable w, A^frO?) -*• "{£)]e •£• 
Now let/be that function whose domain is the set of predicate constants of L* 
and which is such that for each natural number n and for each n-place predicate 
constant w of L+,f(ir) = the set of n-tuples <[i?0]> • • •»frn-i]) such that ij0, • • •, !?„_! 
are closed terms of L+ and irO?0, • • •, i?n_i) e K. 
We proceed by constructing an appropriate normal 2-model. Let A be the set of 
[q] such that 77 is a closed term of L* and for some 1-place predicate variable n, 
e 
\/im(rj) e K. Let B be the set of [rj\ such that t] is a closed term of £,„,, and let R be 
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the function whose domain is X* and which is such that for all n e to: (1) for all 
«-place predicate constants IT in L*, R(-n) = /(TT), and (2) for all n-place operation 
constants S of £„,, R(8) is that function the domain of which is Bn and which is such 
that for all <[£„], • • •, [{,.,]> e B\ tf(S)«[£0], • • •, [fc..^)) = [8(£0, • • •, ^n.1)]. 
We note that by definition of A, B and R, {A, B, R} is an L*-model. 
Consider now the to-termed sequence <Fn>neo) which is such that for each new 
F n is the family of sets /(IT) where rr is an n-place predicate constant of Z,„. We 
set 93 = « J 4 , B, R}, <Fn>n6£0> and observe that by definition S3 is a secondary 
L*-model. 
We show now by recursion: for all assignments a in 93 and for all closed terms ij 
of £*, [rj] = Val(r?, 93, a). Suppose a is an assignment in 93 and that 17 is an indivi-
dual constant of £„,, i.e., 77 is a 0-place operation constant of L*. Then Val(i?, 93, a) = 
R(y)(Q) = b]]- Suppose now that S(r;0, • • •, i7B_i) is a closed term of JL*. Then, by 
the inductive hypothesis, Val(ij() 93, a) = [77,], for all i < n. By definition, 
Val(S(,70, ••-,,?„_!), 93, a) 
= U(S)«ValO,0, »,<*),••-, Valfo,,..!, 93, «)» = [8(Vo, • • •, Vn_J]. 
Accordingly, the above claim that [77] = Val(»i, 93, a) for all assignments a in 93 
and all closed terms 17 of L* holds. 
Where a is an assignment in 93 and ^ is a formula of L#, let {<f>}a be the set of 
formulas <fi of L/such that for some natural numbers n and k, there are pairwise 
distinct individual variables a0) • • •, ccn_u distinct predicate variables a0, • • •, ak_1, 
closed terms 770, • • •, •qn_1 of L* and predicate constants p0, • • •, pk^1 of Z,„ such 
that for all natural numbers 1 < n, a(at) = [77J and for all natural numbers./ < k, 
a(ot) = f(pj) (and />, is therefore a predicate constant of the same number of places 
as Oj), and ^ = <f> \° " n " 1\ °° cr'c~1\. We note that if a is an assignment 
Wo • • • %-iJ Lfo • • • Pfc-iJ 
in 93 and <f> is a sentence of Z,*, then {<£}0 = {<f>}. 
Let Af be the set of formulas <f> of L+ such that for all assignments a in 93 and for 
all sentences tf> in {flB a satisfies <f> in 93 if and only if <fieK. It can be shown that 
every formula of L* is in Af. For instance, from the definition of satisfaction in a 
2-model and the fact that K is a maximally consistent set of sentences of L#, it 
follows that (<f> -*• $) belong to M whenever <f>, t/> e M. Moreover, /\i^4 is in M by 
e 
either Lemma 12 or Lemma 20, while /\[juf> is in M by Lemma 13 if n is an indivi-
dual variable, and, if/i is a predicate variable, by (A13) and Lemmas 21, 22 and 23. 
Since every formula of L* is in M and since {<f>}a = {</>}, where a is an assignment 
in 93 and ^ is a sentence of Z^/then for each sentence <f> of /,„,, <£ is true in 93 if and 
only if <f> € K. Accordingly, since r £ K, then every sentence in T is true in 93. 
It remains only to show that 93 is normal. But if <f> is a formula of L* which is an 
instance of (A6) and a is any assignment in 93, then, since .ST is maximally consistent, 
every sentence in {<j>}a is an axiom and therefore in K; and, accordingly, a satisfies 
^ in 93; that is, <f> is true in 93. Therefore 93 is normal. (Q.E.D.) 
THEOREM 3. If<f> is a secondarily valid formula, then <f> is a theorem of second order 
logic with e-attributes. 
PROOF. Assume that <f> is 2-valid and, by reductio, that <£ is not a theorem of 
second order logic with e-attributes. Let <x0, • • •, an_j be all the individual variables 
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that have free occurrences in <f>; let 7r0, • • •, •7rk-1 be all the predicate variables that 
have free occurrences in <f>; and let <r0, • • •, ak_x be the first k predicate variables 
which do not occur in <f> and which are such that ot is of the same number of places 
as 7T„ for all / < k. Let >p = /\<J0 • • • A ^ - i Aao • • • A a n- i^P° 7r*~1 • Then 
LCT0 • ' - °7c-lJ 
ifi is not a theorem, since otherwise, by Lemmas 20 and 12, $ is a theorem which, 
by assumption it is not. Accordingly, {~>fi} is consistent, and therefore, by Theorem 
2, there exists a normal 2-model in which ~^ > is true. But then, by definition of 
satisfaction, <f> is not 2-valid, which is impossible. (Q.E.D.) 
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